IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

ROLANDO JERRY HERNANDEZ	§	
#927807	§	
	§	
V.	§	A-20-CV-411-LY
	§	
BRYAN COLLIER	§	
and ANGELA NIKKI NATION	§	

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO: THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(f) of Appendix C of the Local Court. Before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At the time he filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff was confined in the Rudd ISF Unit in Brownfield, Texas. On or about April 16, 2020, he was released after discharging his sentence.

Plaintiff was convicted of burglary of a habitation and placed on deferred adjudication for ten years in February 2000. Two weeks later, the State filed a motion to adjudicate. In May 2000, the trial court adjudicated Plaintiff guilty and sentenced him to 17 years in prison. Plaintiff challenges the calculation of his sentence. He complains he was denied "flat time" credit for time

spent in an ISF and in the county jail. He believes his sentence should have expired six months earlier. He seeks damages for the extra time spent in prison.

Plaintiff sues Bryan Collier, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
- Correctional Institutions Division, and Angela "Nikki" Nation, Section Director for Parole Release
Processing and Records of the TDCJ - Paroles Division. Plaintiff alleges Nation provided her
affidavit in his state habeas corpus proceedings indicating Plaintiff was not entitled to "street time"
credit. Plaintiff argues Nation was incompetent and should have known he was challenging the
calculation of flat time, not street time. Plaintiff contends the Executive Director is responsible for
the actions of his subordinates. He seeks monetary damages.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

An in forma pauperis proceeding may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if the court determines the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit. A dismissal for frivolousness or maliciousness may occur at any time, before or after service of process and before or after the defendant's answer. *Green v. McKaskle*, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

When reviewing a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe plaintiff's allegations as liberally as possible. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). However, the petitioner's pro se status does not offer him "an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets." *Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A.*, 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Being sued in their official capacities for monetary damages, Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because such an action is the same as a suit against the sovereign. *Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment generally divests federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain suits directed against states. *Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v. Feeney*, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). The Eleventh Amendment may not be evaded by suing state agencies or state employees in their official capacity because such an indirect pleading remains in essence a claim upon the state treasury. *Green v. State Bar of Texas*, 27 F.3d 1083,1087 (5th Cir. 1994).

C. Supervisory Liability

To the extent Plaintiff sues Executive Director Collier in his individual capacity Plaintiff fails to allege he was personally involved in the calculation of his sentence. This failure is fatal to his claims. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner*, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); *see also Thompson v. Steele*, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing "[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action"). "Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability"; they must have been "personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation or have engaged in wrongful conduct that is causally connected to the constitutional violation." *Turner v. Lt. Driver*, 848 F.3d 678, 695–96 (5th Cir. 2017).

D. Heck v. Humphrey

Plaintiff's claims are also barred by *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) and the Fifth Circuit's application of *Heck* to state prisoner § 1983 lawsuits in *Boyd v. Biggers*, 31 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1994). In *Heck*, the Supreme Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

In this case Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff's recitation of the procedural history in this case indicates just the opposite. Plaintiff challenged the calculation of his sentence in a state habeas corpus application which was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the findings of the trial court. *Ex parte Hernandez*, Appl. No. WR-49,497-03.

RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

It is further recommended that the Court include within its judgment a provision expressly and specifically warning Plaintiff that filing or pursuing any further frivolous lawsuits may result in (a) the imposition of court costs pursuant to Section 1915(f); (b) the imposition of significant monetary sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; (c) the imposition of an order barring Plaintiff from filing any lawsuits in this Court without first obtaining the permission from a District Judge

of this Court or a Circuit Judge of the Fifth Circuit; or (d) the imposition of an order imposing some combination of these sanctions.

It is further recommended that Plaintiff be warned that if Plaintiff files more than three actions or appeals while he is a prisoner which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, then he will be prohibited from bringing any other actions in forma pauperis unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

In the event this Report and Recommendation is accepted, adopted or approved, it is recommended that the Court direct the Clerk to e-mail a copy of its order and judgment to the keeper of the three-strikes list.

OBJECTIONS

Within 14 days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained within this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc.*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(*en banc*); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); *Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-277 (5th Cir. 1988).

SIGNED on April 21, 2020.

MARK LANE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE